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I have been asked to contribute some thoughts on the administrative
process as a political scientist interested in the behaviour of individuals as
members of organized groups. During the past three years I have taught,
jointly with a former professor of law at Osgoode Hall, a course titled "Seminar
in Law and Administrative Discretion." In this course we endeavoured not
only to present some of the outstanding research from the field of adminis-
trative law, but also to provide an introduction to the study of politics which
focused upon concepts, theories and issues from organization theory and the
behavioural and social sciences. One of the three books which students were
requested to purchase and read carefully was Kenneth Culp-Davis' Discretionary
Justice,1 a rather substantial effort by its author to come to grips with the
problem of injustice in the administrative process.
Davis argues that the major source of injustice to individuals arises out
of the exercise of arbitrary discretion by public officials. I want to consider
Davis' argument in some detail in the pages which follow, because it seems to
me that it is one which students of the law must necessarily confront enroute
to an adequate understanding of the scope and limits of law as a device for
modifying, regularizing and pre-defining ranges of permissible official behaviour
in the interest of "justice" to affected parties. Much of what I have to say,
following the presentation of his thesis and basic arguments, will take the
form of an effort to indicate the shortcomings of his position which, I believe,
fails to give adequate consideration to the nature of politics and the "political,"
such as it may be.
Section IH is particularly concerned with the implications of Davis' argu-
ment for "administration" as a political process which, while it may fail to
realize formally rational standards of judicial legalism, ought not, on that
account alone, to be characterized as "irrational." This effort to suggest the
limits of the legal decision as the embodiment of a particular type of rationality
will serve to "locate" Davis in a tradition of thinking about the administrative
process, and to point up the relevance for such an analysis of an opposed, but
not necessarily contradictory, tradition more compatible with the nature of
American-national politics.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Administrative Studies and Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University.
1 K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge, Louisiana:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969).
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Section IV "outers" the analysis a bit further still, concerning itself not so
much with weaknesses in Davis' analysis as with the possible relevance of a
body of research and scholarship necessarily beyond the ken of such a study.
Here the emphasis, instead of being on "politics," is upon "organization" as a
manifestation of human rationality at work. I argue that any study of the
administrative process which fails to consider what is in the final analysis the
behaviour of individuals in organized groups, cannot possibly comprehend that
which is minimally necessary for an understanding of administration as a human
process carried out by individuals who orient their action to the performance of
functions and roles in "typical" social settings.
A focus on "organization" is employed, among other purposes, to the
end of suggesting some reasons why officials will often find it difficult if not
impossible to orient their action to rules which predefine, that is, fix in
advance, their range of permissible discretion. "Organization" is counterpoised
against "action" in this formulation, the latter being defined as behaviour
"rational" because meaningful to the actor and intended by him to realize
particular objectives. A central consideration which concludes Section IV is the
question: To whom is the law addressed?
A few acknowledged limitations and consequent disclaimers on the
writer's part are in order here. A point of view, indeed the intellectual and
scholarly enterprise itself, is as readily conceivable as a limit to knowledge
about the world as it is the basis for particular insights derived from one's
point of view. At its worst the intellectual's "construction" of social reality may
function as a "trained incapacity" which keeps him from giving proper atten-
tion to or even acknowledging the possible relevance of other points of view
which serve as the basis for asking different questions from the ones with which
he is concerned.2 Far from promoting the pages which follow as the "one best
way" to view the administrative process, my remarks and observations are
necessarily supplementary because they presume the existence of a body of
knowledge from which Davis and numerous others have drawn which continues
to be a part of that which, in the context of the analysis of the administrative
process, remains most worthy of being known.
One more point: Davis is an American, and his frame of reference and
large majority of examples are consequently drawn from United States experi-
ence. While I am not in the least in doubt about the conceptual and theoretical
"relevance" of Davis' analysis for any legalsystem fashioned out of the English
common law heritage, I shall necessarily be countering Davis with examples
similarly drawn from recent United States experience and will endeavour to
2 Robert Merton employs Veblen's notion of "trained incapacity" to analyze
organized group processes in "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality" in Merton, Social
Theory and Social Structure (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1957) 195 at 197-200. Alfred
Schutz and Harold Garfinkel "situate" intellectual activity and suggest the extent to which
a cognitive (as well as a practical) interest in social phenomenon is in fact a limiting
interest See Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World" in Schutz,
Collected Papers, Volume H, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962) 64, and Garfinkel,
Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967),
especially Parts 1-3, 8. Also H.T. Wilson, "Rationality and Decision in Administrative
Science" (unpublished paper), passim.
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locate him in one of two peculiarly American traditions of thought on these
matters. I might also add that my own background is American and much of
my graduate work, including my doctoral dissertation, dealt with problems and
issues in American constitutional and administrative law. It seems to me that
the issues raised by Davis, and the presuppositions which guide him in his
definition of the problem and his recommendations for improvement, are too
fundamental and essential to let the context act as a justification for limiting
the readership, although I certainly would agree that this is often a fair com-
plaint by students, faculty, practitioners and the public at large.
11. Davis' Thesis and General Argument
It is an open question whether in the analysis of someone's work the writer
should compare that individual with a wide range of his contemporaries or
should rather indicate the distance he has travelled from the point at which he
began. This is an issue of considerable moment in the social sciences, where
"progress" is often equated with an individual's ability (or propensity) to
incorporate into his own enterprise new approaches and perspectives on the
verge of gaining relative respectability within the confines of his own discipline.
The fact that legal education is presently experiencing a significant restructuring
of its own foundations toward a conception of "evidence" which includes
research findings from the social sciences as relevant data for consideration
should indicate just how far challanges to the traditional categories of concern
have gone.3
While this is no place to go into these events in detail, it is difficult not to
notice how closely tied such changes are to a redefinition by many practitioners,
faculty and students of what the practice of law comprehends. If only a minority
presently forward such a view, it nevertheless draws attention to a revised
conception of the role of the law in a society where it increasingly innovates as
often as it conserves, and (within the rule of law) attacks as often as it defends.
As a subsidiary consideration, notice how this serves to raise the question of
the role legal education and scholarship ought to play vis a vis the practicing
professions.4
Now this revised view of the profession, though it is often a manifestation
of impatience with established ways of doing things, does not always lead to
the request for substantial institutional changes, perhaps even the transcendence
of accepted ways of defining and dealing with problems. Sometimes it leads
to the claim that we must close the gap between ideal and practice by doing
with more diligence what we have been doing, albeit haphazardly and chaoti-
3 For instance Nathan Grundstein, Administrative Law and the Behavioural Man-
agement Sciences (1964), 17 (No. 2) Journal of Legal Education, 121; Thomas Cowan,
Decision Theory in Law, Science and Technology (1963), 17 Rutgers Law Review 499;
Janis D. Runge, The Sociology of a Refugee Centre (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
81.
4See H.W. Arthurs, The Study of the Legal Profession in the Law School (1970),
8 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 183. Arthurs, "Progress and Professionalism: The Canadian
Legal Profession in Transition," Symposium on Law and Social Change, Osgoode Hall
Law School, October 20, 1971.
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cally, all the time. Here the avowed concern is with realizing the ideals of a
particular political system through its legal and judicial system where for
various reasons the ideals, noble though they may be, are often more honoured
in the breach than in the observance. Kenneth Culp-Davis' Discretionary
Justice, while oscillating between these two possibilities, is far more in accord
with the latter orientation than it is with the former.
Looked at from the standpoint of his own scholarly concerns as they have
developed over a not inconsiderable period of time, Davis' essay is an extremely
important contribution to what is (and should be) an ongoing controversy
in the area of public administration and administrative law. To say that
"Discretion is the better part of Davis," seen from the perspective of his own
development, is not to exclude from consideration other questions raised,
debated and studied by scholars in the social sciences which indicate the limits
of his analysis and the extent to which such an effort pre-supposes certain things
about the nature of human society and rationality which are unrealistic and
perhaps even naive. But it does suggest that any analysis of Davis' thesis in
Discretionary Justice begins with the meaning he assigns to "discretion" in the
administrative process.
When Davis uses the term discretion, he has in mind a phenomenon whose
character as it stands must necessarily be problematic in a rule of law repre-
sentative system unless.... This "unless" is the key to understanding how far
Davis has come from where he began. Three references to discretion in the early
pages of the book indicate both the scope and limits of his conception of the
administrative process. Because discretion is Davis' "master" concept, I shall
take the liberty of quoting them in full.
If all decisions involving justice to individual parties were lined up on a scale
with those governed by precise rules at the extreme left, those involving unfettered
discretion at the extreme right, and those based on various mixtures of rules,
principles, standards, and discretion in the middle, where on the scale might be the
most serious and most frequent injustice?... I think the greatest and most frequent
injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale, where rules and principles provide
little or no guidance, where emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do,
where political or other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the imper-
fections of human nature are often reflected in the choices made.5
I think that in our system of government, where law ends tyranny need not
begin. Where law ends discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion may mean
either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasonableness or
arbitrariness. 6
A public officer has discretion whenver the effective limits on his power leave
him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction. 7
Only the last statement satisfies the requirements of a formal definition,
albeit a relatively brief one. Davis goes on to explain his references to "effective"
and "inaction" as an effort to indicate the scope of the problem. The definition
covers not only action which might later be deemed "legal" but that which is
patently illegal or of questionable legality as well. It also comprehends the fact
5 Davis, supra, note 1 at V.
61d.at 3.
7 id. at 4.
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that officers usually exercise discretion by not acting. Finally, discretion "is not
limited to substantive choices but extends to procedures, methods, forms,
timing, degrees of emphasis, and many other subsidiary forms." s
Notice in the three statements how Davis moves from what is clearly an
academic reference to discretion as a problem along a continuum to a view of
discretion seen from the point of view of the situation. This corresponds to the
movement from relative abstractness to specificity. To title a book "Discre-
tionary Justice" is to suggest the possibility that discretion may be positively
necessary to securing justice in the administrative process rather than unalter-
ably opposed to it. To refer to all discretion which takes place in the absence of
specific mechanisms justifying, and perhaps even requiring, its exercise as
"unfettered," is to define it as bad discretion because it is illegal even though it
may be necessary to justice.
Rather than leaving the situation to chance, Davis asserts that the prob-
lem of discretion needs to be covered by law in advance of its exercise. This
point is significant, for it constitutes a recommendation for the extension of
formalized and systematized codification on a rather substantial scale.9 Discre-
tion for Davis is "good" when it is legal, that is, when its exercise conforms to
statutory or regulatory provisions which guide public officials. The ideal for
Davis is a situation in which a formally rational and systematic codification
has eliminated as much "unfettered" discretion (regardless of its outcome) as
is possible, while incorporating that which is necessary in given situations into
procedural and substantive provisions which establish its legality and justify
its exercise. While this may suggest the limits of predefinition as a device to
contemplate in advance the possible range of situations in which administra-
tive action might be called for, Davis does go to some effort to indicate how
bureaux, agencies, and departments and any other administrative units ought
ideally to go about the process of legalizing that discretion which is felt
necessary if the organization is to carry out its mandate effectively. 10
Davis formerly treated discretion as a category of administrative action
alongside rules and adjudication." The fact that he now admits of its possible
legitimacy on the grounds that it is often necessary in the interests of adminis-
trative justice does not mean that he has gotten beyond rather traditional ways
of dealing with it as a problem. One reason for this can be found in his discus-
sion of the "three components" present in the exercise of discretion: facts,
values and influences. It serves to demonstrate a propensity evident in the first
reference to discretion cited earlier, namely, a tendency to characterize admin-
istrative discretion occurring in the absence of specific provisions as potentially
non-rational because "political," and "emotional" in character.
8Id.
9 For an analysis of the origin and significance of "rationality" in the law, and of the
problem of "natural justice" Max Weber, Law in Economy and Society, translated by Max
Rheinstein and Edward Shis, edited with an introduction by Max Rheinstein (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954).
1O Davis, supra, note 1 at 55-56, 103.
11 See, for instance, Davis, Administrative Law, Cases - Texts - Problems (Chicago:
West Publishing Co., 1965) and compare to Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 4.
1972]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
When we isolate what we regard as the exercise of discretion, we find three
principal ingredients - facts, values and influences. But an officer who is exercising
discretion seldom separates these three elements; most discretionary decisions are
intuitive, and responses to influences often tend to crowd out thinking about values.12
In this statement the formal rationality which is prescribed as an approach
to the resolution of the problem of discretion is merged with the scholarly
conceit which forwards academic distinctions like the fact-value dichotomy as
part of a criticism of the necessarily emotive subjectivity of an individual in a
situation where rationality is as likely to be exercised in the absence of provi-
sions as it is in their presence. There are places in the book where Davis seems to
realize this, as, for instance, when he asserts that:
Even when rules can be written, discretion is often better. Rules without
discretion cannot fully take into account the need for tailoring results to unique
facts and circumstances of particular cases. The justification for discretion is often
the need for individualized justice. This is so in the judicial process as well as in the
administrative process. 13
But here Davis is once again speaking of discretion through rules, as opposed
to rules which either strictly forbid or fail to leave room for the exercise of
discretion. This problem of rationality as it appertains to administrative action
will be brought up again further on, in the analysis of the nature of politics
and the political in rule of law representative systems, as well as in the discus-
sion of public officials as situated political actors.
There is a process of reasoning inherent in Davis' argument which one is
tempted to call dialectical because it poses problems at the extremes and for-
wards their resolution in terms of what seems to be a synthesis rather than
simply a golden mean. For example, unfettered discretion is intolerable, given
the injustice it is responsible for. But the ideal of a rigidly formal legal system
which has eliminated all discretion is equally undesirable, and we should not
even aim to realize such a situation given the fact that discretion is often
necessary to justice in the administrative process. That which is simultaneously
desirable and realizable, given the character of our legal system, is an alterna-
tive which synthesizes the need for discretion with a continuing commitment
to legalism and the rule of law. The result: rules which provide for the exer-
cise of discretion in advance of situations which may require it in the interests
of justice.
Now clearly it is not unfair to suggest that we are dealing with another
conception of discretion as a situated phenomenon here, and that the definition
may have been extended to the point where it is inaccurate if not meaningless
to term it discretion per se.14 But I would not want to go quite this far, for I
can conceive of situations where it might be good to have an official aware of
the boundaries of permissible action (or inaction) in the exercise of his duties
and responsibilities at the same time that his response is not rigidly specified.
12 Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 5.
13 Id. at 17. Compare to his statement about discretion as "a tool, indispensable for
individualization of justice," "our principal source of creativeness in government and law,"
yet a tool which if not properly used "can be a weapon for mayhem or murder," Id. at
25-26.
14 See R. Dworkin, The Model of Rules (1967), 35 University of Chicago Law Review
at 14.
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I would, however, agree that there is probably good cause for labelling Davis'
view of the process "discretion on a one way ratchet," as Hart and Sacks have
done.15 This is not only warranted from Davis' first reference to discretion
cited earlier, where it is conceived of (in its "unfettered" form) at one end of
a continuum with specific rules at the other, but also in his discussion of the
way an administrative organization provides for the exercise of discretion
necessary to its acting effectively and with justice to affected parties. 16
While the case against unfettered discretion is dealt with by reference to
specific examples which presume that codification and systematization would
eliminate them, the problem of the opposite extreme is handled for the most
part in Davis' analysis of the obsolescence and consequent danger implicit in
adherence to the extravagant version of the rule of law doctrine and the legis-
lative principle of non-delegation in the absence of specific standards. It is in
this chapter that Davis' partial liberation from some of the traditional notions
and presuppositions of administrative process under the common law becomes
evident. It is a necessary complement to the chapter which precedes it because
it deals with the problem posed by the opposite extreme.
While Davis is not arguing that these doctrines were never relevant, it is
clear that continued reliance upon them is as much a threat to administrative
justice as is the existence of unfettered discretion. As a matter of fact, reliance
upon either or both doctrines in the contemporary context effectively amounts
to the same thing. Far from being an unrealizable prescriptive ideal, they are
to some extent responsible for the exercise of the very unfettered discretion
which they proscribe so completely. This is because these doctrines fail to
acknowledge the possibility of "good" discretion altogether, treating it instead
as a problem which can (and should) be eliminated through better definition
of standards.' 7 Davis puts it this way:
My opinion is that, paradoxically, today's excessive discretionary power is
largely attributed to the zeal of those who a generation or two ago were especially
striving to protect against excessive discretionary power. If they had been less zealous
they would have attempted less, and if they had attempted less they might have
succeeded. They attempted too much - so much that they could not possibly
succeed - and they were decisively defeated. They tended to oppose all discretionary
power; they should have opposed only unnecessary discretionary power.iS
These two doctrines were developed by conscientious people, including legal
philosophers and judges, whose worthy purpose was protection against governmental
excess. But both doctrines grossly overshot, and both have been decisively defeated.
The worst of it is that milder and sounder opposition to excessive discretionary
power became identified with the extravagant version of the rule of law and with the
15 H. Hart and A. Sacks, The Legal Process (tent. ed. 1958) at 160-180. A forthcoming
reconstruction of the problem of discretion as necessarily concerned with the character of
the tasks or functions officials are performing as situated actors is J. Jowell's Law and
Bureaucracy in the City (in press), a significant advance over such a view of discretion.
16 Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 55-56. Also Davis, Confining and Structuring
Discretion (1970), 23 Journal of Legal Education 56, and the comments by Judge Friendly
and Professor Reiss which follow at 63-76.
17 Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 46-5 1, where he suggests the limits to
such a view, even in its most sophisticated form. See, for instance, Henry J. Friendly, The
Federal Administrative Agencies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1962).
18 Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 27.
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non-delegation doctrine and was largely pulled down in the defeat of those two
doctrines. And our legal system has not yet recovered its balance. 19
The basic technique for synthesizing the good from each extreme position
is rule-making, and the key element in Davis' reconstruction of administrative
law is the rule. Two points need to be made before discussion is carried any
further. First, rules are not restricted to generalizations from experience in
Davis' definition, but comprehend the anticipation of situations which might
arise exhypothese. 20 Second, the relevant agency provides its own procedural
and substantive constraints in the form of rules establishing necessary discre-
tion, while external agencies remain in the background as a check on their
action.
After stating that "a rule need not be in the form of an abstract generali-
zation; a rule can be limited to resolving one or more hypothetical cases,
without generalizing," 21 Davis goes on to defend his reasoning. If we are really
interested in confining discretion as early as possible in the history of an agency
or bureau (and Davis really is), then this "practical need" must override all
other considerations. Davis argues that the typical administrator "has formu-
lated in his own mind - and perhaps even in his files - some firm answers to
significant hypothetical cases on each side of a line that must be eventually
drawn," and therefore requiring him to postpone making a rule "until he is
prepared to hazard an abstract generalization is falling far short of doing the
clarifying he can safely do." In short, "a rule need not contain any generaliza-
tion."22 Davis is not excluding rules as generalizations and formal adjudication
from agency policy making. He is only arguing that rules as hypotheticals must
be included as a legitimate and necessary tool in the interests of justice.
Clearly Davis' concern is with the ways an agency, steering between the
nondelegation doctrine and "unfettered" discretion, provides for the discretion
it needs within its own developmental process. Rules as either generalizations or
hypotheticals may be procedural or substantive in character or an admixture
of both, but in any case the procedure for attaining rules remains "one of the
greatest inventions of modern governments. 23 Davis is here speaking more of
the theory of the rule-making procedure than anything else, for in few aspects
of the administrative process is the gap between ideal and reality greater.24
19 Id. at 28.
20 Id. at 59-64.
21 Id. at 60.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 65.
24 Studies of the "independent" federal regulatory agencies reveal this with alarming
regularity. See, for instance, FCC commissioner Nicolas Johnston's The Second Half of
Jurisprudence: the Study of Administrative Decision-Making, an extended review of
Davis' Discretionary Justice, in (1970), 23 Stanford Law Review 173 at 176, 179-80, but
especially at 196-200. I attempted to defend a similar preference for formal adjudication
over rule-making in FCC policy formulation processes in H.T. Wilson, The Regulation of
Standard Radio Broadcasting, 1934-1952: Defining the Public Interest through Licensing
Policies (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, Department of Political
Science, January 1968). Given the "politics" of commission decision-making, I was taking
specific exception to the unequivocal support for rules advanced in Marver Bernstein,
Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1955).
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This idea of an agency developing a rule-orientation to protect itself,
including its discretion, relies on two of three techniques for improving justice
in the administrative process: confinement and structuring.25 In both instances
the agency is legislating for itself by building its own discretion into its experi-
ence as a limit to the realm of decisional choice in subsequent situations. It is
to be carefully distinguished from the third technique - checking - which is
carried out by agencies external to the one in question and conforms to the
standard support for institutional checks and balances where any exercise of
governmental power is involved. By confining discretionary power Davis means
"eliminating and limiting" it, "fixing the boundaries and keeping discretion
within them. '26 Ideally "self-confinement" should take the following form in
an agency's development:
When legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without meaningful
standards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest feasible time, and
then, as circumstances permit, should further confine their own discretion through
principles and rules. The movement from vague standards to definite standards to
broad principles to rules may be accomplished by policy statements in any form,
by adjudicatory opinions, or by exercise of the rule-making power" (emphasis
mine).2 7
Although the two may overlap, "structuring" means something more
specific for Davis because it appertains to techniques of controlling "the
manner of the exercise of discretionary power within the boundaries" set by
confinement. To impart "structure" to the exercise of discretionary power is to
"regularize it, organize it, produce order in it,"28 again in the interests of
justice to affected parties. Not surprisingly: "Administrative rule-making is
an especially important tool both for confining discretionary power and for
structuring it." But in each case the rule performs a distinct function confining
discretionary power by establishing limits on it, structuring discretionary power
by specifying "what the administrator is to do within the limits."29 While some
discretionary power remains beyond the scope of any techniques aimed at
structuring it, Davis cites openness as "the natural enemy of arbitrariness and
a natural ally in the fight against injustice" and argues that the most useful
ways of structuring include: "open plans, open policy statements, open rules,
open findings, open reasons, open precedents, and fair informal procedure. 3 0
m. Discretion, Rules and Politics
This type of rule-making procedure, which becomes a most significant
part of an agency's policy formulation process in Davis' argument, is an ideal
whose realization in practice is not something the agency can guarantee no
25 Johnston refers to this recommended procedure of self-control as "a two-step
process," supra, note 24 at 177. Davis devotes chapters 3 and 4, at 52-141, to the analysis
of confinement and structuring. See also Davis, Confining and Structuring Discretion, and
comments by Friendly and Reiss, supra, note 16.
26 Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 55.
2 7 Id. at 55-56.
28 Id. at 97.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 98.
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matter how diligently it undertakes to carry out his recommendations. The
absence of any reference to the "politics" of a process which by Davis' own
admission involves "facts, values and influences," points up one of the most
glaring weaknesses of this study, not because his recommendations are unfeas-
ible but because without some appreciation of the political element in decision-
making, no realistic account of actual agency behaviour can be given. Failure
to do what Davis claims to be necessary is "explained" as either wilful intran-
sigence or plain stupidity on the part of public officials.
Yet Davis does fit into one of two major perspectives on the administra-
tive process which I shall endeavour to present and distinguish. Situating
Davis in a tradition of thinking is not done here with an eye to discrediting or
discounting his views, but rather as an aid to comprehending the significance
for his analysis of the situation of his background and basic presuppositions
about administrative process.3 1
Grant McConnell, in the context of a discussion of "self-regulation" of
business by business a few years ago,32 suggested the existence of two
traditions of analysis of the American administrative process. The first
was "political," "sought solutions by reorganization," and tended to view
administration as a problem of power which could be resolved only by the
incorporation of administrative activity "outside" the purview and control of
the President into the Executive branch. The second was "legal," rejected
"mere changes in the administrative structure, and sought reforms of proce-
dure" designed to make administrative agencies function more like "real"
courts.3 3 If the political approach saw the so-caled "independent" agencies as
a "headless fourth branch of government" posing a problem for executive
authority, the legal approach tended to tie confidence in Article 1I judicial
courts to the effort to faithfully respond to and interpret the popular will
embodied in the national legislature.3 4
Emphasis on legal procedures has characteristically been tied in the
American administrative law context to faith in the representative character
of Congress as an institution embodying the values of pluralism which is
and/or should be supreme over the Executive Branch in domestic political
affairs. This view leads characteristicaly to the claim that Congress is doing
the best it can, and that, given the pressures and constraints under which it
operates, political issues must be dealt with there and not in the administrative
31 This distinction between "understanding" and "reducing" someone's work is a most
significant one in the sociology of knowledge. See, for example, Karl Mannheim, Ideology
and Utopia (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1936) and Robert Merton, Social Theory
and Social Structure (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1957) at 456-509.
32 McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1965) at 246-297.
33 Id., at 283.
341n this regard, one might compare the President's Committee on Administrative
Management, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937, to
the Attorney General's on Administrative Procedure, Final Report (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941) as instances of the "political" and "legal"
approaches respectively.
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process per se, where the important thing becomes the development of stand-
ards, principles and rules at all costs. 35
This point of view, which clearly comprehends Davis' analysis of the
problem of unfettered discretion, espouses a residual belief in the rigid dichot-
omy of politics and administration bequeathed contemporary analysis by
populism but especially by progressivism. The language of facts and values
remains prominent in studies which presume such a narrow conception of
politics and the political, as a number of commentators have pointed out.36
McConnell formulates the problem most perceptively in terms of the differ-
ence between the development of standards seen as a technical problem and a
focus on the extent to which it is "politically possible to develop the needed
standards." "At this point, where the issues of procedure encounter the issue
of structure, the problem of criteria and the problem of power meet."37
There is absolutely no comprehension of power as a problem for admin-
istrators in Davis. Again with reference to the independent agencies, it is
impossible to make sense of their behaviour and policies lacking a willingness
to view such agencies as "open systems" subject to an immense amount of
external control, direction, and criticism.38 While all three "branches" of the
American federal government have been and continue to be involved signifi-
cantly in shaping the destiny of such agencies, this is especially true for
Congress. Perhaps the most glaring indictment of the political na'vet6 of the
"legal" approach is its perception of Congress as representative, responsible,
and the embodiment of all that is great in the theory of American political
pluralism.39 The truth is that practically every instance of agency corruption
can be equalled or bettered by "relationships" between members of important
committees and subcommittees of the national legislature and special interest
groups .4
35 Davis seems to assume this in Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 especially at
38-39. But see Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, supra, note 17 at 13-18.
36 Robert Dahl, The Science of Public Administration: Some Problems (1947), 7
Public Administration Review 1; Dwight Waldo, Development of the Theory of'Demo-
cratic Administration (1952), 46 American Political Science Review 81. Edward Banfield,
The Decision-Making Schema (1957) 17 (No. 4) Public Administration Review 64. All
three essays are concerned with the thesis presented by Herbert Simon in Administrative
Behaviour (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), 2nd edition. I attempted to go somewhat further,
viewing the problem of "decision" as one involving certain problematic "taken-for-
granteds" about the character of human rationality in the social world in H.T. Wilson,
Rationality and Decision in Administrative Science (unpublished paper).
37 McConnell, supra, note 32 at 287.
38 H.T. Wilson, The Regulation of Standard Radio Broadcasting, 1934-1952 (unpub-
lished dissertation) at 1-34.
39 See Norton Long's perceptive essay on the superior "representativeness" of civil
servants, albeit in the absence of the method of formal election, in "Bureaucracy and
Constitutionalism" at 64-76 of Long, The Polity (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962).
40 See H.T. Wilson, The Regulation of Standard Radio Broadcasting, 1934-1952
(unpublished dissertation) at 74-127 and Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Com-
missions (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1959), the latter being a rather impassioned but
nevertheless accurate account in the form of a case study of Schwartz' personal involve-
ment in the problems of commission regulation.
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Indeed, the so-called "life cycle" of these independent commissions from
birth to growth to maturity to inevitable decline can be explained only by
direct reference to the gradual "symbiosis" between members of Congress and
special interests. 41 The "political" analysis of agency decline, to the point
where they eventually come to serve mainly as "fronts" for legitimizing indus-
trial and business self-regulation (read no regulation), contrasts strikingly
with Davis' recommendations about the way agencies should ideally go about
providing for the exercise of "good" discretion.42 Davis is operating as if it
were possible to isolate "politics" with the people's representatives, leaving
administration as a technical matter to be worked out through legal (or legal-
ized) procedures which are modelled on the courts, but with an added dose of
responsibility thrown in in the form of external checks on the process of self-
limitation through rules which confine and structure discretion while they
announce policy in the form either of generalizations or hypotheticals.
The view that discretion constitutes a problem of administrative respon-
sibility soluble by better and clearer "definition of standards" is a "legal"
approach not only because of its naive (or non-existent) conception of power
and politics in rule of law democracies, but because it tends to conceive of
"definiteness" solely in terms of vagueness, with a clearer meaning discover-
able in the technical search for the "intent" of the legislation. Wayne A. R.
Leys, responding to this view of discretion in terms of definiteness, argued
thirty years ago that inherent in the difficulties of administrative law specialists
like Ernst Freund was their failure to comprehend the political ramifica-
tions of the problem of definiteness as appertaining to ambiguity as well as
"vagueness."
Arguing against definiteness as an "adequate criterion" of good judgment,
Leys suggested:
The crucial philosophical criticism of Freund's analysis is that it gives a
misleading appearance of simplicity to the concept of definiteness. Philosophical
controversies have long since sensitized students of philosophy to the indefiniteness
of 'definiteness.' 'Indefinite' may mean (1) 'vague,' 'without limits,' or it may mean
(2) 'ambiguous,' 'capable of referring to several set limits but not certainly specifying
any one limit.'43
Leys points out that legislatures are indefinite in their language "for more
than one reason." While it may be an oversight, "a recognition of their own lack
41 Herbert Simon, David Smithburg and Victor Thompson, Public Administration
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950) at 25-54, 381-401; Emmette Redford, The Administra-
tion of National Economic Controls (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952) at 385-386;
Marver Bernstein, supra, note 24 at 74-102; Samuel Krislov and Lloyd Musolf (eds.), The
Politics of Regulation (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964); Murray Edelman, The Symbolic
Uses of Politics (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1964) at 22-43.
42 Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 55-57. While there is some recognition of
agency regulation as a political problem at 48-49, Davis remains committed to the view
that self-control through confinement and structuring will allow the agency to resolve
through rules those issues the legislature is unable or unwilling to resolve. But this is quite
different from the realization that the regulating agencies themselves are subject to political
pressures from members of the legislature as well as interest group representatives.
43 Wayne A.R. Leys, Ethics and Administrative Discretion (1943), 3 Public Adminis-
tration Review 10 at 14.
[VOL. 10, NO. 1
Discretion and the Administrative Process
of skill and experience," an indication that this is a subject "which can never be
dealt with in general rules," or even evidence of an unwillingness "to spend
the time required to hit the nail on the head," it may be something other than
simple vagueness. The legislature may be passing the buck, its vagueness
purposeful "ambiguity" given its inability to "muster a clear majority in
favour of a clear standard."44 There may, in short, be no vagueness at all, but
rather a political reason for indefiniteness. Leys offers an alternate classifica-
tion system, distinguishing three classes of discretionary power:
(1) technical discretion, which is freedom in prescribing the rule but not the
criterion or end of action,
(2) discretion in prescribing the rule of action and also in clarifying a vague
criterion - this is the authorization of social planning;
(3) discretion in prescribing the rule of action where the criterion of action is
ambiguous because it is in dispute - this amounts to an instruction to the official to
use his ingenuity in political mediation.45
The reason I have elaborated on Leys' argument at such length has to do
with the position taken by those who espouse the legal approach to resolving
the problem of discretionary power. Freund's position conceives of discretion
as a purely technical problem where the criterion or end of action is given in
vague standards, leaving the administrator to "fill in the gaps." Freund is
trapped in the nondelegation doctrine to the extent that the failure of the
legislature to forward clear criteria is thought to be remediable by the legis-
lature, who must take action given the fact that: "A statute confers discretion
when it refers an official for the use of his power to beliefs, expectations or
tendencies instead of facts" (emphasis mine). According to Freund:
It is possible to distinguish roughly three grades of certainty in the language of
statutes of general operation: precisely measured terms, abstractions of common
certainty, and terms involving an appeal to judgment or a question of degree. The
great majority of statutes operate with the middle grade of certainty.46
To the extent that Freund is arguing that the legislature's failure means
administrators must view their task as one of "arriving at a definite standard,"
he too is beyond both the extravagant version of the rule of law and the non-
delegation doctrine. This suggests that from the standpoint of Leys' analysis
Davis and Freund have very much in common. Indeed, except for Davis'
broadened conception of what a rule is and how one develops a body of rules
which confine and structure discretion, both tend to view the administrative
process as a technical problem in achieving more definite standards. But while
Freund conceives of discretion ideally as a situation in which the administrator
limits himself to providing rules where the criterion of action is assumed not
44 Id.
45 Id. at 18.
46 Ernst Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes (1921), 30 Yale Law Journal
437; Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1928) at 71. A recent study recommends restoring the rule of law by
allowing the U.S. Supreme Court to return to the Schechter rule, thereby giving it the
power to declare "invalid and unconstitutional any delegation of power to an administra-
tive agency that is not accompanied by clear standards of implementation." See Theodore
Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969) at 298. One page later he
expresses his gratitude to Davis' Administrative Law Text (1965) for an appreciation of the
value of rule-making, but the traditional conception of the rule as a generalization.
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to be in dispute, Davis does suggest that more may be required of the adminis-
trator than simply "technical discretion" as Leys defines it.
At the same time, Davis' commitment to formalization and systemati-
zation seeks to turn discretion in clarifying a vague criterion as well as
"prescribing the rule of action" (type 2) into a technical matter through
strategies of confinement and structuring.47 This is one reason for his insist-
ence that rules be seen as hypotheticals, and not simply as generalizations
from prior experience. It is because he realizes that there is more to discretion
than the statement of specific rules as generalizations that he seeks to incor-
porate the middle type of discretion into his effort to steer between the Scylla
of unfettered discretion and the Charybdis of the extravagant version of the
rule of law and the non-delegation doctrine.48
I want to conclude this part of the analysis with a brief discussion
of Leys' third class of discretion, which is concerned with the purposeful
ambiguity of legislation, and therefore the decidedly political character of
"discretion" in the administrative process. Davis' viewpoint, presuppositions,
and approach make it impossible for him to see the political system as dis-
penser of symbolic reassurance as well as tangible benefits to affected parties.
Yet one of the most important observations to be made about the character of
democratic politics is the extent to which gaps between ideal and reality need
to be understood as functionally necessary given the rule of law. By failing to
comprehend this aspect of political life, Davis' plea for justice, however much
it claims to be aimed at impartiality based upon the development of standards
of procedural fairness, is unable to account for the behaviour of officials in
the situated context of administrative action where symbolic reassurance is as
"real" to relevant general publics as the tangible benefits accruing to special
interests organized for political action.
Murray Edelman has developed this argument in considerable detail and
with great sophistication in the process.49 Edelman considers himself a
"realist" in the sense that he harbours no illusions about the public interest
as anything else but a rationalization, a temporary "resultant of forces" in
Pendleton Herring's words. 50 He sees publics, not a general public with a
general interest, when he surveys the political scene. Indeed, it is the very
characteristics of technological society which simultaneously suggest the
limitations of the people's elected representatives and the fact that agitation
47This is Davis' criticism of Friendly's position in The Federal Administrative
Agencies, supra, note 17 at 21-22. See Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 47-51.
48 See Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 64 No. 12 below, for his response
to Judge Friendly's skepticism about rule-making, where rules are defined to mean
generalizations from past experience.
49 Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois
Press, 1964).
50 Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1936). Glendon Schubert, in the context of an analysis of various academic
uses of the "public interest" concept in the political theory of American public administra-
tion, depends heavily on Leys' three classes of discretion, equating type one with the
"rationalist" approach, type two with the "idealist" approach and type three with a
"realist" approach to politics. It is in this sense, then, that Edelman is a "realist" See
Schubert, The Public Interest (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), at 25-29.
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about a public issue begins to subside at precisely the point in time in which it
would need to increase in intensity if the interests of law enforcement were
really to be served. Edelman would focus on organization and specialized
competence, both premised on immediate pecuniary interests, as the key
factors distinguishing "groups" of persons exhibiting various degrees of con-
cern and/or interest regarding the operation of the political system.51
He would be the first to criticize the position that there is a general public
whose interest is to be served by government against special interests whose
concerns are unalterably opposed to the public's welfare. He would take a
decidedly political view of the reasons behind legislative indefiniteness and
the subsequent performance of functions by administrative officials as actors in
a system where much of what they do is necessarily symbolic in character
yet a functional necessity which cannot realistically be conceived of as a
"deviation" or an exercise in pure arbitrariness. Edelman would see the
administrator's job to lie in "prescribing the rule of action when the criterion
of action is ambiguous because it is in dispute," in other words "an instruction
to the official to use his ingenuity in political mediation," but with the added
proviso that his job may necessarily include the odd mortification process or
degradation ceremony in the interests of symbolic reassurance to specific and
peripheral publics.52
Edelman's relatively cynical view of the administrative process, and of
politics generally, is not something which has totally escaped Davis' attention.
As a matter of fact, there is a point in the study where Davis explicitly men-
tions this general position as defeatist when it is taken to "cover" any efforts
to improve the process, and I agree with him.53 Edelman's analysis of the
"symbolic functions of politics" depends heavily upon what he calls the
"game" theory of law enforcement in his chapter on the administrative system.
I believe Edelman's analysis is probably quite accurate, and that much reform,
whether by reorganization or improvement of legal procedures, might readily
be absorbed into the symbolic functions of a rule of law representative system.
The "problem" of discretion in Davis links up with the character of law
enforcement in Edelman where the latter argues that democracy and "the rule
of law" is impossible where laws are enforced as if each were a fiat, "the
command of the sovereign" in the Austinian formulation, rather than "a
virtuous generalization around which a game can be played."
Concrete legal objectives are ordinarily pursued as though administrators and
potential defiers were involved in a game with rather clear rules. The basic rule is
51 Edelman, supra, note 48, 22-43 at 23-29. For a cogent criticism of interest group
theory, see Lowi, supra, note 46, especially at 296-97.
52Erving Goffman, Embarrassment and Social Organization (1956), 62 American
Journal of Sociology 264, and Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation
Ceremonies (1956), 61 American Journal of Sociology 420 convey the consequences for
parties to such events. The study of regulation by "independent" commission, seen in this
light, has a "mission impossible" aura to it, such that if agency members are "caught" by
congressmen at critical points in legislative careers, the latter will disavow all knowledge
of the collusion and compromise to which they themselves might formerly have been a
party.
53 Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 164-166.
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that a fairly large proportion of the instances of non-compliance will not be detected
or penalized. Automobile drivers and policemen are both aware that most speeders
will not be caught or fined, and both adapt their behaviour to this assumption: drivers
speed when the chance of being caught is slight or considered worth taking. Police-
men stop some but not all violators, and let some of these off with a warning. As long
as the game is played in this way, both drivers and policemen accept the order of
things fairly contentedly; drivers paying occasional fines complainingly but without
massive political protest, policemen noticing a certain amount of modest surpassing
of the posted limits without further action. 54
Edelman goes on to notice what happens, given the symbolic character
of politics and the necessary gap between the law and its enforcement, when a
police officer takes his job too seriously. Officer Muller's "difficulty" contrasts
rather strikingly with Davis' discussion of selective enforcement to quite dif-
ferent ends.55 While I appreciate Edelman's analysis, it seems to me that it
does indicate a problem to which persons interested in political affairs (not
just "experts," appointees, and elected officials) might readily address them-
selves. I can understand Davis' concern about this problem, and, while I do
not necessarily believe that it can be fundamentally resolved in the ways he
recommends, I do think his concern is not reducible solely to the sort of
political na'vet6 which Edelman has allegedly revealed.
It strikes me that implicit in a good part of Edelman's analysis is a rather
severe naivet6 of his own about the character of politics, which often takes the
form of playing down the fact that there may be real conflicts of interest
implicit in the answer to the question: Who gets the tangible benefits and who
gets the "symbolic reassurance" time and time again? Seen in this light the
idea of politics and law enforcement as a "game" only has meaning from the
standpoint of the detached observer with no real stakes in the immediate out-
come. Put another way, Edelman's example, cited above, is far from "typical,"
except to the extent that it constitutes what might be termed a middle-class
game. Speeding in a car, as well as cheating on income tax returns (another of
his examples) are, after all, middle-class "crimes." You've got to have a car
in the first case, and be "in the know" about the internal revenue scene (or be
able to hire somebody who is) in the second to get away with them. Compared
to the kind of situations members of the various "under-classes" find them-
selves in, especially with the police, Edelman's examples lose their humorous
quality. He seems to have realized this to some extent in a subsequent effort.56
Sometimes one gets the impression that this is what motivates Davis'
attack on "selective enforcement." For the most part, however, it appears to
this writer that Davis' criticism of law enforcement is less concerned with
power disparities and consequent discrimination given the unequal bargaining
power of some in the rule of law "game" than with the fact that occasionally
these groups manage to "get away with" something (like gambling or prosti-
tution, for example), or with the fact that organized and well heeled special
54 Edelman, supra, note 49, at 44-45.
55 Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at 170-72, and Edelman, supra, note 49
at 45.
56Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (New York: Markham Press, 1969).
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interests expecting "justice" in their noble battle with government, have been
"disappointed" by the exercise of unfettered discretion.
IV. Position, Roles and Organization
At this point I want to shift my focus of concern from weaknesses in
Davis' analysis to a supplement to it. Instead of looking at administrative
processes as necessarily "political" I want to concentrate in this section on the
structure within which administrative behaviour takes place, and the extent to
which the fact of purposeful organization must be considered in any assess-
ment of the problem (as well as proposed "solutions") inherent in effective law
enforcement. Edelman's view of law enforcement as a game in constitutional
and representative political systems is premised fundamentally on a picture of
human interaction (as well as "socialization") taken from George Herbert
Mead.57
Mead argues that human beings develop not only their conceptions of
"society" but their definitions of "self" from the learned yet relatively natural
process of "mutual role taking." Taking the role of the other needs to be
viewed as an active rather than a passive process, however, for it occurs in
concrete situations where the individual's "construction '58 of social reality is
an effort to respond to the perceived wishes of other persons who are "signifi-
cant" to him. His "socialization" comprehends not only the process of his
becoming a "person" to himself; it presupposes that social life is a situated
phenomenon involving continuous self (and other) definition on the part of
the individual concerned. Somewhere early on this process of self and world
definition in terms of significant others is "generalized" and perceptions of
what "society" requires emerge.
This does not mean that significant others are no longer relevant to the
individual's process of reality construction, nor does it mean that this process
becomes any less active than it was before. It remains fundamentally situa-
tional in character, in the sense that the situation constitutes the immediately
relevant phenomenon within which interaction between persons occurs and
must be analyzed.59 It is active because interaction with others requires
individuals to simultaneously interpret the meanings of others' actions and
construct their own line of activity. Groups are dynamic ongoing networks
made up of persons engaged in the effort to make sense of something. That
this includes making indications to oneself, that is, engaging in self-interaction,
is crucial to an understanding of what reality construction means.
57 See especially George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society edited with an introduction
by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Anselm Strauss (ed.),
George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology (Chicago: Phoenix, 1964); and Edelman, The
Symbolic Uses of Politics, supra, note 49 at 47-52.
58 The term comes from phenomenology and, more generally, from the sociology of
knowledge. See especially Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966) and Burkart Holzner, Reality
Construction in Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1968).
59 Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive
(1940), 5 American Sociological Review.
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Individuals must act, indeed, only individuals can and do act, and what-
ever constructs or "typifications" they may possess for encountering and
interpreting their situated social reality in no way eliminates the need for such
activity. Herbert Blumer, Mead's foremost disciple, explains the implications
of such a view of human action:
It means that the human individual confronts a world that he must interpret
in order to act instead of an environment to which he responds because of his
organization. He has to cope with the situations in which he is called upon to act,
ascertaining the meaning of the action of others and mapping out his own line of
action in the light of such interpretation. He has to construct and guide his action
instead of merely releasing in response to factors playing on him or operating through
him. He may do a miserable job in constructing his action, but he has to construct it.60
The possibility that such an enterprise could conceivably be interpreted by
social scientists as non-rational is one of the major reasons why the scholar's
cognitive interest in social phenomena needs continually to be perceived as a
situated and therefore a limiting interest in fact.61 This is a matter I shall
discuss in some detail further on.
First, however, I want to argue that administrative action takes place in a
formally organized setting and that therefore organization needs to be counter-
poised against action and reality construction because formal organization is a
conscious effort to structure, and consequently to delimit, the range of possible
interpretations of the behaviour of others as well as possible responses in the
form of lines of action. Virtually absent from Edelman's analysis, save for a
general appreciation of the problem, is the fact of formal organization in
political life, and the effect it must necessarily have on the individual called
upon either to enforce the law or to make sense of it to himself and to others.
By formal organization I mean what is broadly termed "bureaucracy" in lay
as well as intellectual and professional circles today, a "system of roles
graded by authority" whose members in role are characterized by being
"peculiarly goal orientated." 62 Formal organization is a conscious rational
effort to realize group objectives in effective and/or responsible ways by
attempting to minimize the search by group members for appropriate,
expected or even prescribed (required) behaviours. 63
60 Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1969) 1-60 at 15. Also see Charles Bolton, Is Sociology a Behavioural Science?
(1963), 6 (No. 2) Pacific Sociological Review at 3-9.
61 This is discussed in Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Rationality in the Social
World," in Schutz, Collected Papers, Volume 11 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962) 63.
Harold Garfinkel, "The Rational Properties of Scientific and Commonsense Activities,"
in Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1967) 262-283; and H.T. Wilson, Rationality and Decision in Administrative Science
(unpublished paper).
62The first phrase belongs to C. Wright Mills, according to Robert Presthus, in
The Organizational Society (New York: Random House, 1962) at 4. The idea of a goal
orientation comes from Talcott Parsons' "A Sociological Approach to the Theory of
Organizations" in Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: Collier
Macmillan, 1960) 16 at 17.
63 See Peter Blau and W.R.-Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Co., 1962) especially at 1-58.
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Any effort at design of this sort is formal in the sense that it seeks to
predefine what is thought by particular individuals to constitute the most
"rational" way of co-ordinating human actions toward the attainment of
objectives for which their technical skills and managerial and professional
competences are presumably required. It is in this sense that bureaucracies
may usefully be conceptualized as "structured fields." 64 This is not to ignore
the point made earlier, namely, the fact that only individuals act, that formal
organizational principles are prescriptions or expectancies rather than descrip-
tions of the way a particular group functions. Again citing Blumer:
Instead of accounting for the activity of the organization and its parts in terms
or organizational principles or system principles, it seeks explanation in the way in
which the participants define, interpret, and meet the situations at their respective
points. The linking together of this knowledge of the concatenated actions yields a
picture of the organized complex. Organizational principles or system principles
may indeed identify the limits beyond which there could be no concatenation of
actions, but they do not explain the form or nature of such concatenations. True, a
given organization conceived from organizational principles may be imposed on a
corporate unit or corporate area, as in the case of a reorganization of an army or an
industrial system, but this represents the application of somebody's definition of
what the organization should be.65
Having made these points, let me attempt to enumerate what might be
termed basic "building blocks" in a theory of organizational behaviour. Such
an effort should make it possible to comprehend the implications of formal
organization for the administrative process and for law enforcement in
particular. As "a system of roles graded by authority," bureaucracies are
"structured fields" which attempt to integrate specialization with a principle
of authority expressed in a hierarchy of superior-subordinate relationships. 66
As subsets of the more generic category "groups," formal organizations are
collective situations where sheer numbers alone frequently justify resort to
such structuring techniques. 67 The basic unit of analysis in the study of
formally organized groups is the position or office, defined as a prescribed or
actual location in a particular group. Positions are further defined by reference
to roles, those behaviours appropriate to, expected of or prescribed for the
occupant of a given position in a group.68
Expectations may be precisely specified, in which case we speak of tasks,
which collectively constitute a job description for a particular position.
64 Presthus, supra, note 62 at 98-99, for instance.65 Blumer, supra, note 60 at 58. He goes on: "The point of view of symbolic inter-
actionism is that large-scale organization has to be seen, studied, and explained in terms
of the process of interpretation engaged in by the acting participants as they handle the
situations at their respective positions in the organization." Id. (Emphasis mine)
66See Victor Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961)
1-81 at 5-6.67 See, for example, Theodore Caplow, Organizational Size (1957) 1 Administrative
Science Quarterly 484; and Richard Hall et al, Organizational Size, Complexity and
Formalization (1967) 32 American Sociological Review 903.
68 See Daniel Levinson, Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational
Setting (1959) 58 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 170, for a most perceptive
distinction between role demands, conceptions, and actual behaviour. An excellent com-
pendium of revelant readings with a comprehensive bibliography is Bruce Biddle and
Edwin Thomas (eds.), Role Theory: Concepts and Research (New York: Wiley, 1966).
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Routinized tasks carried out with little or no discretion with respect to
sequence, pace, etc., may be a part of any position in any group. However,
when one's role is virtually exhausted by his job description, this is usually an
indication of a relatively low status position in formal organizations. The
further up the hierarchy one goes the more likely he is to find positions whose
roles are social and discretionary in character rather than task routinized and
formally specific. 69 This is usually because the occupants of such positions are
called upon to exercise varying amounts of "authority" over others, as well as
responsibility for the actions of others and for their own decisions. As a
matter of fact, the absence of job descriptions often makes an evaluation of
the performance of higher echelon personnel difficult if not impossible, giving
substance to Peter's principle of incompetence as an approach to the analysis
of the dysfunctions of hierarchy in organized groups. 7
0
Victor Thompson has suggested, in two highly significant studies, how
increasingly irrational from the standpoint of formal rationality bureaucratic
organization is. Once capable of coordinating individuals carrying out routine
specialized tasks involving little if any discretion, bureaucracy is increasingly
incapable of absorbing and efficiently coordinating the efforts of highly spe-
cialized persons whose work is made more difficult by hierarchy and the formal
model generally. As "line" administrators and executives become more depen-
dent (as does the organization as a whole) on professionally and technically
trained "staff" personnel representing the social process of specialization
outside the organization, techniques and "structures" appropriate to the
management and control of non-discretionary specialized tasks defined organi-
zationally become less and less "rational".
Thompson argues that it is precisely this gap between ability and formal
authority which compels administrators to use bureaucracy as a device to
shore up and defend the legitimacy of their prerogatives in the face of mount-
ing evidence to the contrary.71 This suggests that it is formal rationality
rather than the (re) discovery of principles of humanistic and/or demo-
cratic management and administration which is compelling the substantial
modification (or extinction) of bureaucratic practices and procedures in
69 This is discussed in Richard Cyert and Kenneth MacCrimmon, "Organizations," in
The Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume 1 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley,
1968) at 576-578, where the authors distinguish between "programmed" and "discre-
tionary" components in organizational role definition.
70 Lawrence Peter, The Peter Principle (New York: William Morrow, 1969). Victor
Thompson, supra, note 66 at 66-73 indicates how dysfunctional hierarchy as an insti-
tutionalized dominance mechanism can be when one is trying to assess managerial
performance.
71 Thompson, supra, note 66 at 114-177; Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation
(University, Albama: University of Alabama Press, 1968); Presthus, supra, note 62 at
150-55; Chester Barnard, "Functions and Pathology of Status Systems in Formal Organi-
zations," in William White (ed.), Industry and Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946).
Role conflict and ambiguity is the focus of a well-researched study by Robert Kahn and
associates, Organizational Stress (New York: Wiley, 1964). Also see Bruce Biddle and
associates, The Concept of Role Conflict (Arts and Sciences Studies, Series No. 11, no date
of publication).
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numerous types of organized group contexts. 72 It was something which Max
Weber, so often maligned for his "narrow" view of bureaucracy, fully anti-
cipated in his law of increasing rationalization, so crucial to any comprehen-
sion of the meaning of his work.
That bureaucracy is increasingly threatened with obsolescence in some
organizations does not necessarily imply that such a response will be forth-
coming in the administrative processes of government and the public sector
generally. There is a strong conviction among many that bureaucracy and
formal organization is the best guarantee against the irresponsible exercise of
power.73 To the extent that legislation takes the form of enabling statutes
aimed at establishing administrative organizations in government, it directly
partakes of the same kind of rationality as that which is embodied in tables
of organization and manuals of procedure. While in both cases the intention
is to predefine and formalize, Davis' concern is with the effective control of
official discretion through the agency's generation of rules confining and
structuring it over time. Davis appreciates the need to focus on the situation
in which administrative action does or does not occur, but he does not realize
that individuals called upon to enforce the law or to act in any administrative
capacity whatsoever have job descriptions and organized group relationships
as well as legislation to contend with.
If it was once possible to structure work settings in industry on Taylor's
premise that "a man is a horse" so far as the organization was concerned,
continued perception of certain administrative personnel as task specialists
carrying out relatively non-discretionary jobs is absurd as well as patently
dangerous. Davis recognizes this in his frequent references to selective enforce-
ment by police officers, whose power in given situations is often far in excess
of their abilities and sense of discrimination and judgment. But he fails to
realize that it may well be the nature of the situation rather than the char-
acter and level of education of police personnel which makes his remedy far
from a sure thing.74 Police admittedly have an immense amount of potential
discretion, and it may be wise to endeavour to control it in the ways he has
suggested. But Davis is too ready to reduce the actions of police officers, as
well as other administrators, to irrationality and emotions in the absence of
formally rational predefinitions of the situation.
The process of reality construction referred to earlier suggests just how
actively rational human interaction is, especially when rationality is seen to
lie in the actor's intention to put means in the service of particular goals or
72 Victor Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation; H.T. Wilson, The Dismal Science
of Organization Reconsidered (1971) 14 Canadian Public Administration 82.
73 This is especially the case in university administration. See, for instance, H.T.
Wilson, "The Academy and its Clients," Report to the Federal Commission on Relations
between Universities and Governments (Ottawa, 1970) and an abbreviated version pub-
lished under the title of Academic Bureaucracy (1971), 78 Queen's Quarterly 343.
74 While a passing nod is made to politics, power and conflicts of interest which may
be structured into the system (at 24), Davis for the most part holds firm to a belief that
formalization can provide the basis for rational law enforcement, given the fact that the
"median education" of policemen is 12.4 years. Discretionary Justice, supra, note 1 at
89-90.
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principles rather than in his success in these endeavours. Rationality defined
by reference to the consequences of individual (and collective) actions
rather than to the intent and effort of actors is characteristically a problem
academics, and anyone else not participating in the immediate situation, are
bound to have unless they are careful when assessing its meaning for them.75
The idea that the formally organized group carrying out the role require-
ments of its positional incumbents constitutes rationality per se, while the
individual is nothing more than a bundle of needs, impulses and emotions,
gives the lie to continuing efforts to adjust him to the organization by isolat-
ing and atomizing his "problems" by reference to subjectivity and "values".
It may be just as "reasonable" to speak of the inherent conflict between the
individual and the organization as it is to speak of "mutual adjustment" and a
"natural harmony of interests. '76
A final point suggests itself here, and arises out of the question: To
whom is the law addressed? On the basis of available knowledge about the
outstanding characteristics of contemporary technological societies77 I would
want to argue that ultimately the law is addressed neither to the citizen nor
to the law enforcement officer, but rather to legal and other specialists who
continue to be its interpreters and arbiters. This is not to argue that adminis-
trators in formally organized and relatively closed contexts do not and cannot
comprehend the limits to action contained in rules confining and structuring
their discretion. But I would have to distinguish clearly between the relatively
stable social settings in which most governmental agencies regulate and ad-
minister (or give the appearance of same) and law enforcement by the police.
Even though Davis gives not inconsiderable attention to the police in his
study, it seems to me that it is in this area of the so-called "administrative
process" that his recommendations for improvement are least likely to bear
fruit. On the other hand, it is precisely in the relatively stable areas of the
administrative process that political influences and factors are adequately com-
prehended by Davis will likely continue to make control of unfettered discre-
tion very difficult. Finally, the absence of any recognition of the limits posed
by organization as a technique for coordinating and directing human action,
and the fact of conflicts within organizations in the public sector, suggest
that even in allegedly "client-centered" bureaucracies (welfare, urban devel-
opment, poverty) Davis' discretion-based approach may have limited value.78
The belief that natural justice is best guaranteed by resort to formally
rational techniques of law-making is one to which Max Weber drew attention
over half a century ago in the context of a critical analysis of the costs as
75 See Blumer's injunction to social scientists involved in "research," Id. at 51.
76 As Karl Mannheim did in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1940), 55-75 at 57-58. Also see H.T. Wilson, Rationality and
Decision in Administrative Science (unpublished paper).
77 For example, Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society- (New York: Random
House, 1966); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964);
H.T. Wilson, The Sociology of Apocalypse (unpublished paper); H.T. Wilson, Continental-
Ism and Canadian Higher Education (1970), 1 Canadian Review of American Studies 89.
78 See Peter Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1955) and Blau and Scott, supra, note 63 at 59-86.
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well as the benefits of "progress" in the West. 79 The effort to anticipate and
predefine in advance the behaviour appropriate to public officials can be self-
defeating when the limits of such an endeavour and the contribution of other
points of view are not given proper consideration. To the extent that Davis'
view of the administrative process, and the role of law in shaping it, does not
admit of the sorts of considerations raised here and elsewhere, his analysis of
the problem of discretion is, to paraphrase a colleague, necessarily analogous
to that of a man armed with a flashlight in search of the nature of darkness.
The closer he gets to it the more he chases it away.
79 Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation", in From Max Weber, edited by Hans Gerth
and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 129, especially at 137-145;
Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949) 164; Weber,
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribners, 1958) 13-31,
181-182; Weber, Law in Economy and Society, edited with an introduction by Max
Rheinstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943).

